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ABSTRACT 
 
     This study identifies the effects of capital structure on the financial performance of 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh. A dataset of 187 MFIs developed by UK 
donor agencies with the collaboration of The Institute for Inclusive Finance and 
Development, InM was used to study the relationship between Capital Structure and 
Financial Performance of MFIs from Bangladesh. Panel data regression analysis was 
used for this study using the Random effect and Fixed effect models. Return on Asset 
(ROA), and Net Income to Expenditure (NIER) are used as measures of financial 
performance. The findings indicate that Equity to Asset Ratio (EAR), Debt to Loan Ratio 
(DTL), Risk, and Size are the factors that influence NIER. Furthermore, EAR, and DTL 
have a positive effect on ROA and Risk has a negative effect. The findings have 
implications for policymakers and management of MFIs for attaining sustainable 
financial performance with optimum debt and equity portfolios.  
 
Keywords: Microfinance institutions, Microcredit, Capital structure, Financial 
performance 
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CHAPTER ONE  
1.0: INTRODUCTION 
     Poverty alleviation is one of the main objectives of the United Nation’s Sustainable 
Development Goals, and microcredit is used as an effective tool in poverty alleviation 
around the globe (Al-Mamun & Mazumder, 2015; Karim & Osada, 1998; Weber, 2013). 
Microcredit is a significant innovation in development policy and a key element for the 
21st century’s socio-economic development as microcredit helps to improve socio-
economic conditions of the poor, and it has also reached millions of customers, billions of 
dollars are distributed to micro-entrepreneurs over the last few decades (Al-Mamun & 
Mazumder, 2015; Roodman & Morduch, 2013).  These loans are very small, as low as 
US$ 75, and are usually short-term loans repaid on a weekly basis over one year. 
Globally there are more than 67 million households served by microfinance programs 
(Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). There are 1033 large scale Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) globally that offered their services to 116.6 million borrowers in 2015 
(MIX, 2017). These financial service providers (FSP) have a gross loan portfolio of US$ 
92.4 billion and US$ 58.9 billion of deposits. The South Asian region, Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, have a greater coverage with the primary 
focus on serving female borrowers, representing 92% of total borrowers (MIX, 2017). At 
a global level, FSPs recorded an annual growth of 8.6% in the loan portfolio and 13.5% in 
borrowers (MIX, 2017). Further, microcredit performance in terms of repayment and 
financial sustainability is exemplary (Evans, Adams, Mohammed, & Norris, 1999). 
     Microfinance can be defined as the financial service package such as credit, savings, 
insurance and other financial services targeted at the poor. Thus, microfinance has a 
broader scope than the microcredit. Institutions offering financial service packages 
targeting the poor are called Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). MFIs often start lending 
operations to a low-income community and help them to develop different types of 
micro-entrepreneurial ventures in developing countries. Usually, these clients have a lack 
of credit history, collateral, or both (Baklouti, 2013; Hartungi, 2007; Quayes, 2012). 
     MFIs are different types of business organizations that provide microfinance services, 
ranging from small non-profit organizations to large profit ones, like Grameen Bank, 
Credit Unions, Credit Co-operatives, Rural Banks, and NGOs in Bangladesh. In the 
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beginning, microfinance service was offered by non-government organizations and 
gradually it is migrating towards an institutional foundation offering microfinance 
services based on market principles. There are different types of sources of funds for 
MFIs. They receive funds from international donors, local government, and market-based 
sources such as banks, financial markets, and other investors. Donor funding and 
subsidized funding were the main sources of funds for MFIs in Bangladesh in the 
beginning. However, over time, donor support and subsidized funding declined. As a 
result, MFIs are increasingly relying on market-based funding. Thus, the source of 
funding of MFIs now is the different combination of subsidized and market-based 
funding. 
     Unlike the traditional banking system, the landing of MFIs is known as supervised 
credit. Most of the clients of microfinance institutions live in remote areas and these 
micro-financing operations are extensively dependent on personal contacts. Moreover, 
MFIs offer other non-financial services such as training, education, and health services to 
their clients besides the financial services. Field workers of the MFIs go to clients’ houses 
to get access to them to provide loans and get the weekly collection. Field workers also 
supervise and advise MFIs’ clients about financial and nonfinancial services. As many 
field workers are involved to provide different services to their clients, microfinance 
institutions have greater transaction cost per loan. That is why MFIs charge very high, 
30%–60%, nominal interest rates to their clients (Dehejia, Montgomery, & Morduch, 
2005). Commercial banks calculate interest-rates considering costs of funds, bad-debt 
costs, and administrative costs; whereas MFI loans are subject to additional higher 
transaction costs including all other costs (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009). 
Despite the higher interest rates, poor households take loans from MFIs as they do not 
have a cheaper alternative. They do not have access to a loan from other financial 
institutions except for local money lenders because of a lack of collateral. Money lenders 
ask for almost 100% interest rates which are two to three times higher than the MFIs’ 
interest rates. That is why the poor take loans from MFIs to change their socio-economic 
condition. With the loan from MFIs, they can create small micro-entrepreneurs, create 
income-generating activities for themselves and their family members and can come out 
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of poverty. Thus, it can be concluded that MFIs contribute to socio-economic 
development of poor clients. 
     Unlike typical banks or other financial intermediaries, MFIs are facing two types of 
challenges; first, they have to provide different types of financial services to the poor and 
secondly, they have to also cover their costs or expenditure to sustain the business. That is 
why MFIs have both financial and social performance goals. The financial goal which is 
also known as sustainability is related to the institution’s financial feasibility and its 
capacity to earn profits and run its operations smoothly. On the other hand, the social 
performance goal or outreach has two scopes: Depth of outreach and Breadth of outreach. 
The depth of outreach is measured by the average loan size divided by the country’s gross 
national income (GNI) per capita, which reflects the poverty level of clients. And the 
breadth of outreach is measured by the number of clients reached, which reflects the size 
of the clientele base. MFIs need to arrange their capital to maintain sustainable operations 
and also to focus on outreach for their success. Although, both social sustainability and 
financial sustainability are the goals for NGOs (Dichter, 1996); in many cases, however, 
it is costly to provide credit to the poor. Many MFIs in developing countries have had 
limited achievements in cost efficiency (Hermes & Lensink, 2011). There is a trade-off/ 
challenge for MFIs to choose between financial sustainability and/or social sustainability 
(Baklouti, 2013). According to Microcredit pioneer Yunus (2007), MFIs’ financial 
sustainability can lead to social outreach as a financially sustainable institution can ensure 
long-term operation and service to the poor community. A sustainable or efficient MFI 
can serve the social purpose better than a bankrupt MFI. 
     MFIs of Bangladesh started as NGOs to serve financial services and other non-
financial services to the poorest of the poor. They have gone through an important 
evolution from donor-funded projects to market-based financial institutions. They have 
both social and economic objectives and need to be financially solvent in an era of 
declining foreign aids and other subsidized financial supports. They need to cover their 
cost for the social service as well as for the financial service. For many MFIs, members 
are the owner and shareholder of the institutions, other institutions may own jointly by 
private shareholders and members. In this study, the main objective is to analyze the 
capital structure and its impact on financial viability, as MFIs are now using different 
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sources of funds. Many studies (Tchuigoua,2015; Tchuigoua,2014; Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2007; Khachatryan, Hartarska & Grigoryan, 2017; Kar, 2012; Bogan, 2012; Abrar & 
Javaid, 2016) analyzed the financial performance of MFIs of all over the world using 
capital structure. This study focuses on the effect of capital structure on MFIs 
performance and to identify the opportunities for increasing the sustainability and growth 
of lending institutions. There is a lack of empirical studies on capital structure and 
performance of MFIs from Bangladesh. This study fills this gap by investigating the 
relationship between capital structure and performance of MFIs from Bangladesh. 
     In the beginning, most of the MFIs used to receive donor funding and subsidized 
funding in Bangladesh. Gradually donor support and subsidized funding dried up. As a 
result, they are increasingly relying on market-based funding. Thus, the source of funding 
of MFIs now is the combination of subsidized and market-based. It is our interest to 
examine if the source of financing has any significant effect on the financial performance 
of MFIs in Bangladesh. If proportional subsidized financing is more than other sources of 
financing, it may affect their performance negatively because they might not be very 
serious in utilizing their capital. On the other hand, because of low-cost funds, it may 
affect their performance positively because they may perform efficiently. Again, MFIs 
that function with private money needs to work hard to make it a profitable business as 
they have costly funds, so it may affect their performance positively or negatively.  Thus, 
the capital structure or source of funding may influence positively or negatively the 
financial performance of the MFIs. 
     As micro-credit has a significant role in poverty alleviation, that is why it brings a lot 
of attention both from policymakers as well as in academic researchers (Hermes & 
Lensink, 2007; Hermes & Lensink, 2011; Weber & Ahmed, 2014). However, the studies 
(Bhanot & Bapat, 2015; Al-Mamun, Mohiuddin, & Mariapun, 2014) reveal that a large 
number of microfinance programs still depend on donor subsidies to meet the high costs 
collateral free delivery approach as well as high-interest rate called as “Poverty Penalty” 
paid by poor borrowers (Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, Cuéllar-Fernández, & Fuertes-
Callén, 2016). Moreover, MFIs’ declining financial performances came into the attention 
to the need for examining the efficiency of MFIs (Wagner & Winkler, 2013; Azad, 
Munisamy, Masum, & Wanke, 2016). Several studies were conducted to investigate the 
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impact of various Microfinance program’s effectiveness in different regions of the world; 
however, there is insignificant research on MFIs (Haq, Skully, & Pathan, 2010). More 
specifically, only a few studies that address the relationship between capital structure or 
sources of funds for MFIs and performance of the MFIs. No serious empirical work in 
Bangladesh exclusively focuses to understand the relationship between the capital 
structure of MFIs and their financial performance. This study tries to fill this gap. More 
particularly, this study attempts to measure the effects of capital structure on 
microfinance institutions performance measured by financial self-sufficiency and return 
on asset.  
     There is a growing realization that profit-oriented programs supported by the private 
sector will give more opportunities to fulfil the social objectives by expanding access to a 
range of borrowers unable to reach by donor-funded MFIs. The fundamental question 
remains to explore is: Does the financial structure in terms of financial leverage affect the 
financial performance: financial sustainability, depth, and breadth of outreach of MFIs? 
For MFIs to become financially sustainable, the source of financing is important. The 
main objective of this study is to examine how capital structure affects the financial 
performance of MFIs from Bangladesh where the level of poverty is wide, and deep and 
MFIs are fastest in growing. To identify how capital structure composition (Equity to 
Asset, Debt to Loan, Deposit to Loan, and Deposit to Asset) affects the performance of 
MFIs by focusing on Return on Assets (ROA), Net Income to Expenditure (NIER), 
operational and financial self-sufficiency. This study shows how different sources of their 
capital affect their performances. As donor funds for microcredit services are depleting, 
only financially sustainable MFIs might survive and get more investment for this purpose 
from private investors on a cost-benefit basis. That is why this study investigates the role 
of different kinds of capital sources and their effects on the performance of MFIs from 
Bangladesh, the birthplace of the micro-finance movement.   
Research Questions: 
Based on the previous discussions, the current study aims to answer the following 
research questions: “Is there any relationship between capital structure or sources of 
capital and the performance of the MFIs? What are the factors that determine the financial 
performance of MFIs”? 
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1.1: MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN BANGLADESH 
     In Bangladesh, the microcredit program was initiated by Prof. Muhammad Yunus in 
1976 in order to improve the socio-economic condition of the poorest of the society, and 
that microcredit movement has been pioneering in early 1980. Further, microcredit 
programs have occupied a central place in poverty-oriented strategies as poverty 
alleviation largely depends on microcredit programs in Bangladesh (Kabeer, 2001; Karim 
& Osada, 1998). Since 1990, Bangladesh experienced rapid growth and also achieved 
tremendous success in developing innovative microcredit models, service and 
diversification (Chowdhury, Ghosh, & Wright, 2005).  
     About 2,116 NGOs, some of which are very small, provide microcredit service to the 
millions of poor rural people at a low cost in Bangladesh. Specifically, Bangladeshi 
NGOs provide collateral-free microcredit to poor women to improve their socio-
economic condition. Further, NGOs and rural people are connected and also mutually 
dependent through microcredit operations in Bangladesh. NGOs have become successful 
to improve socio-economic conditions of rural poor people (Ahmad & Townsend, 1998); 
for instance, ‘BRAC’ is considered as one of the largest successful NGOs in the world 
(Develtere & Huybrecht, 2005). A study (Nawaz, 2010) claims that although 
microfinance has resulted in a moderate reduction in the poverty alleviation, there are still 
more prospective clienteles remaining out of reach of many MFIs.  
     In Bangladesh, there are mainly four types of institutions involved in micro-finance 
activities. These are 1) Grameen Bank (GB), a member-owned specialized institution, 2) 
around 1500 Non- Governmental Organizations (NGO) like BRAC, Proshika, ASA, 
BURO-Tangail, BEES, CODEC, SUS, TMSS, Action- Aid, etc. 3) Commercial and 
Specialized banks like Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB), Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan Bank 
(RAKUB) and 4) Government sponsored microfinance projects/ Programs like BRDB, 
Swanirvar Bangladesh, RD-12 and others which are run through several ministries viz., 
Ministry of Women & Children Affairs, Ministry of Youth & Sports, Ministry of Social 
Welfare, etc. Credit services of this institutions can be divided into six groups: i) general 
microcredit for small-scale self-employment-based activities, ii) microenterprise loans, 
iii) loans for ultra-poor, iv) agricultural loans, v) seasonal loans, and vi) loans for disaster 
management. Loan amounts up to BDT 50,000 or US$600 are generally considered as 
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microcredit and loans above this amount are considered as microenterprise loans. As per 
Microcredit Monetary Authority, for 2015-2016 economy year total loan amount of 
Microcredit was BDT 1005.57 billion or US$12.07 billion, outstanding amount was BDT 
618.76 billion or US$7.43 billion), number of microcredit clients were 31.07 million, 
total clients of microfinance institutions were 36.20 million, savings was BDT 372.00 
billion or US$4.46 billion that accelerates the overall economic development process of 
the country. Bangladesh government developed a framework, rules, and regulations for 
the smooth functioning of MFIs and established a regulatory body which is known as 
Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA). MRA is the central body to monitor and 
supervise microfinance operations of NGO-MFIs and to promote and foster sustainable 
development of the microfinance sector in Bangladesh (Badruddoza, 2013). MRA ensures 
the enforcement of sanctions in the event of any MFI failing to meet the licensing and 
ongoing supervisory requirements. 
     This sector is basically financed by the different types of sources: savings collected 
from clients, cumulative surplus or profit, concessional loan received from sources such 
as PKSF, grants received from national and international donors and commercial bank 
borrowing. Initially, the foreign donation was the major source of fund for these 
organizations, the contribution of which stood too near about 50% of the total fund until 
1996.  After 1996 it had declined sharply and became only 17% of the total fund in 
December 2001 as per Microcredit Monetary Authority. Because of the declining trend of 
foreign donation, the MFIs-NGOs have concentrated on accumulating funds from internal 
sources such as saving mobilization from their members. While the total fund increased 
significantly over time, there was only a little change in terms of the composition of the 
fund. The most important source of funds turned out to be clients’ savings which was the 
single most important fund support for the sector. The cumulative surplus was the second 
most important source of fund. Loans from commercial Banks turned out to be the next 
more important one. Loan from Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), a microfinance 
wholesale funding agency also provides a large portion of loan fund at a subsidized rate. 
The least important source appeared to grant from the donor agencies as the previously 
donor driven NGOs are now trying to rely more and more on local sources of funds with 
the decline in foreign funding. Table 1 shows the evolution of sources of funds for MFIs 
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in Bangladesh. Donor funds are declining and loans from the commercial bank are 
increasing. 
 
Table1: Evolution of sources of funds for MFIs in Bangladesh (Billion in BDT) 
Source of 
Funds 
June, 
2011 
June, 
2012 
June, 
2013 
June, 
2014 
June, 
2015 
June, 
2016 
Clients' 
Savings 
63.3 
(34.46%) 
74.99 
(32.62%) 
94 
(33.63%) 
107 
(34.21%) 
135.41 
(33.94%) 
170.46 
(34.42%) 
Loan from 
PKSF 
31.77 
(17.30%) 
33.58 
(14.61%) 
34.07 
(12.19%) 
34.52 
(11.04%) 
37.77 
(9.47%) 
40.76 
(8.22%) 
Donors' 
Fund 
7.01 
(3.82%) 
7.06 
(3.07%) 
7.1 
(2.54%) 
6.86 
(2.19%) 
5.22 
(1.31%) 
5.11 
(1.03%) 
Cumulative 
Surplus 
50.3 
(27.38%) 
65.44 
(28.47%) 
83.26 
(29.79%) 
100.94 
(32.28%) 
137.71 
(34.52%) 
166.97 
(33.67%) 
Loan from 
Commercial 
Banks 
23.58 
(12.84%) 
32.65 
(14.20%) 
42.7 
(15.28%) 
51.5 
(16.47%) 
68.57 
(17.19%) 
95.01 
(19.16%) 
Other 
Funds 
7.73 
(4.21%) 
16.17 
(7.03%) 
18.39 
(6.58%) 
11.91 
(3.81%) 
14.24 
(3.57%) 
9.85 
(2.02%) 
Total: 
183.69 
(100%) 
229.89 
(100%) 
279.52 
(100%) 
312.73 
(100%) 
398.92 
(100%) 
488.16 
(100%) 
Data source: Microcredit Regulatory Authority Database 
 
1.2: MICRO-FINANCE AND ITS COMPONENTS 
     Microfinance is a package of several services including a small dollar value loan that 
MFIs provide to their clients. Microfinance provides not only financial services but also 
human and social capital development services to their economically marginalized clients 
to help them succeed in their endeavor of social entrepreneurship.  
1.2.1: Clients 
     The clients of MFIs are basically poor, self-employed, low-income entrepreneurs 
performing their activities at their household. Their small businesses are focused on retail 
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stores, street sale, handicraft production, agriculture, animal farming, and small 
production or different types of services. Though MFIs provide financial assistance to 
poor, low-income people, they are not considered as the “poorest of the poor” 
(Ledgerwood,1999). MFIs do not provide financial services to extremely poor, skill-less, 
ill people. Though microfinance is considered one of the powerful instruments against 
poverty, financial services, particularly loans, are not always suitable for everyone. Loans 
are appropriate for the people who are able to take the economic opportunity in 
generating profits, and who are able to pay the repayment schedules after adjusting their 
cost. People who are extremely poor, ill, malnourished, and without skills or employment 
opportunities need grants or other public funding sources for the improvement of their 
economic situation (Robinson, 2001). Grants or other kinds of supports are the most 
efficient form of supporting this category of the population since the majority is not able 
to timely service the loans. 
     Most of the MFIs’ clients are women, with only 33 percent of all microfinance clients 
being men. (CGAP,2012). Women are better than men at paying back loans.  Women 
clients tend to have a lower risk of having overdue loans than men.  
1.2.2: Microfinance Providers 
     Various types of microfinance providers offer microfinance ranged from informal to 
formal (Ledgerwood, 1999). This formal-informal structure depends on the degree of 
supervision by governments outside of the organizational structure and governance 
(Helms, 2006). 
     Informal providers have a simple organizational structure, lack government 
supervision, and consist of moneylenders, traders, deposit collectors, pawnbrokers, 
community savings clubs, friends-family, and agricultural input providers. Formal 
providers are credit unions, commercial banks, NGOs (Non-governmental 
Organizations), cooperatives, member-based organizations, and sectors of government 
banks. NGOs mainly work in remote rural areas thereby providing financial services to 
the persons with no access to banking services. They also provide health services, 
education services: especially to women and children, and training for unemployed 
people besides financial services.   
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1.2.3: Products and Services 
     MFIs offer different types of products and services to their clients. These products and 
services are mainly financial services, in addition, they provide some nonfinancial 
services. Some most common products and services are described below: 
1.2.3.1: Credit Service: 
     MFIs provide credit to poor people who are not able to provide collateral or any other 
security. Because of the lack of security, poor people do not have access to a credit 
facility from the formal credit sources (Helms, 2006). The main purpose of these credits 
is not only for productive purpose but also for other non-productive purposes, for 
example: households, consumptions, education, marriage, or others.  
     Microfinance institutions basically provide credits to the poor through group or 
individual lending (Hermes & Lensink, 2007; Lehner, 2009). Individuals who have some 
level of security, such as their reputation among peers and society, and income sources, 
may get loans directly from MFIs (Lehner, 2009; De Aghion & Morduch, 2000). Another 
way to provide loans is to create a small group of people who have a common wish of 
getting the same type of financial service. Usually, poor people organize themselves in 
small groups, and each participant accepts joint responsibility which is called joint 
liability, liability for own self and also for other members of the group, for the loan 
(Hermes, 2006; Hermes & Lensink, 2007). Some empirical studies show that self-selected 
groups perform better than groups selected by MFIs as problems of under-investment 
may be ameliorated and repayment rates are also improved (Natarajan, 2004). The poor 
also create a larger group, usually 30-100 members, which is known as the village 
banking model and access loans to the group itself rather than to individuals 
(Ledgerwood, 1999).  
1.2.3.2: Human and Social Capital Development 
     Micro-finance services are provided to poor households principally in rural areas. 
More than 90% of clients are poor women with little or no formal education. The socio-
economic, religious and cultural context in developing countries such as Bangladesh is 
not welcoming to social entrepreneurship headed by women.  To make them successful 
social entrepreneurs, MFIs need not only to provide credit services but also access to 
human and social capital development services (Khanam et al. 2018). They could help the 
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village ladies to form groups, raise their voice, make them aware of their rights and help 
them with basic education so that they can run their micro-businesses properly. MFIs 
such as Grameen Bank organize a weekly meeting of their members, help them to 
organize as a group, provide them training on socio-cultural and political issues that 
concern them, motivate them to work together, and become a social force. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
     Sources of funds for MFIs are not only various kind of donations, charities, but also 
subsidized loans, commercial loans, savings, equity, and debts. Because of financial 
crises, stagnant or low economic growth of major donor countries, there is a diminishing 
trend of donor funding. MFIs need to search for their funding from commercial sources to 
meet the demand of their microfinance services. This trend indicates that MFIs need to 
achieve sustainability by using commercial funds. However, many skeptics consider that 
with commercial funds, the social objective of MFIs will be compromised (Ledgerwood 
& White, 2006). At the same time, MFIs need to achieve financial sustainability; i.e., a 
status when their service, infrastructure level, and standards are delivered according to a 
long-term plan without the need to increase interest rates or reduce services. 
Sustainability of MFIs refers to economic viability (Zeller & Myer, 2002). NGO-turned-
MFIs started to get better access to external capital as they shifted from donor-dependent, 
subsidized capital to private funding by attracting private investors as a part of their 
transformation into regulated institutions through commercialization (Christen & Drake 
2002; Tchuigoua 2015). Over the years, microfinance institutions have started to collect 
the deposit from their clients, which allows the poor to be savings-oriented. Moreover, 
MFIs provide the needed services to more poor clients, as well as lower the costs of 
capital by transforming into deposit-collecting institutions (Delgado et al. 2015; 
Hartarska, Parmeter, & Nadolnyak 2010; Malikov & Hartarska 2017). 
     Various types of subsidized funding and/or donations and commercial funding are the 
two major funding sources of microfinance institutions. Commercial funding creates 
pressure on the governance of MFIs to provide their services and ensuring payback of the 
loans. It also enables the recipients to develop a sense of responsibility and proper use of 
the fund for successful ventures. Commercially funded MFIs focus not only on increasing 
revenues but also decreasing expenses so that they can have enough revenue to cover 
operating expenses. Conversely, grants and donations create some inertia as the fund 
providers do not expect the return. MFIs with access to donor funds may not have these 
pressures to make the profit; that is why they may deliberately choose outreach over 
efficiency by serving poorer or rural clients with higher delivery costs (Armendáriz de 
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Aghion & Morduch, 2005). According to Lehner (2009), Westley (2006), and Arianto 
and Indonesia (2004) profit-driven loans from private sources can be more successful at 
achieving social objectives than money from the public, or tax-payer sources. The 
financing structure of the MFIs can also be categorized as liability financing and equity 
financing.  Policymakers need to know the optimum mix of liability and equity financing 
for the MFIs. Depending on the sources of funds, each fund has different costs that 
contribute to the rate applied while lending loans to borrowers. MFIs collect fund from 
diverse sources in order to create an optimum mix of funds that reduce overall cost. 
Again, commercial funds are necessary for the on-going expansion of the micro-finance 
services. According to Khachatryan, Hartarska, & Grigoryan (2017), the performance of 
MFIs is influenced by the interest of the stakeholders behind the capital. They used panel 
data from MFIs from Eastern Europe and used seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
method. They mentioned that the grants are helpful for better depth of outreach; 
concessional loans are useful for improving outreach without affecting financial results. 
Tchuigoua (2014) found that creditors rights and financial sector development of a 
country influence the level of external funds of MFIs. Thus, if the financial sector is on a 
well-established foundation and obeys the rules, MFIs will have more access to external 
funding and they will be complementary to the classic financial sector. However, 
Tchuigoua (2015) found that there is no difference in terms of having access to external 
funds whether the MFI is for for-profit market based or not-for-profit MFIs.  
     Bhagat and Bolton (2008) tried to estimate the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance considering the inter-relationships among corporate 
governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership 
structure in their paper. They found that better governance is positively correlated with 
better operating performance, and board independence is negatively correlated with 
operating performance.  
     To investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed 
firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) during a five‐year period, Abor (2005) used 
regression analysis in the estimation of functions relating the Return on Equity (ROE) 
with measures of capital structure. This study found a significantly positive relationship 
between the short-term debt ratio and profitability, and a negative relationship between 
 14 
long-term debt ratio and profitability. However, for the total debt, this study indicated a 
significant positive relationship between total Debt to Total Asset Ratio and profitability 
as Return on Equity (ROE) (Abor, 2005). This research suggests that profitable firms 
depend more on debt as their main source of fund and in this Ghanaian case 85% of the 
debt is short‐term debt. Some other studies also provided empirical evidence supporting 
this positive relationship between debt level and firm’s performance (Gill, Biger, & 
Mathur, 2011; Hadlock & James, 2002). On the other hand, there have been some other 
studies that have indicated empirical evidence of the negative relationship between debt 
level and firm’s performance (Abor, 2007; Cassar & Holmes, 2003; Gleason, Mathur, & 
Mathur, 2000) 
     Abor (2007) analyzed the effect of debt policy or capital structure on the financial 
performance of small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana and South Africa. 
Using various measures of performance, the results of this study indicated that capital 
structure, especially long‐term and total debt ratios, negatively affect the performance of 
SMEs.  
     Abrar & Javaid (2016) considered Return on Assets (ROA), Operational Self 
Sufficiency (OSS), and Return on Equity (ROE) as dependent variables to measure the 
profitability and Deposit to Asset, Net Deposits, and Debt to Equity ratio as independent 
variables and number of women borrowers, size regulations, and age as control variables. 
This study used the random-effect-model to analyze cross-sectional unbalanced-panel 
data for the years of 2004-2010 of about seventy countries from all over the world. They 
found that deposit is the lowest cost financial source for MFIs. They also found that 
highly leveraged MFIs enjoy higher profitability relative to the less leveraged MFIs, and 
MFIs with more women borrowers enjoy significantly higher profitability because of less 
default-risk. Generally, female borrowers have the tendency to pay regular loan 
repayments compared to males. 
     Bogan (2012) studied the effects of capital structure on self-sufficiency and efficiency 
for a global sample of MFIs and indicated that the size of an MFI’s assets and an MFI’s 
capital structure are associated with performance. It showed that asset size of MFIs has an 
effect on sustainability, and outreach and grants as a percentage of assets are significant 
and negatively related to sustainability but are positively related to MFI cost per 
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borrower. Bogan (2012) also found causal evidence supporting the assertion that 
increased use of grants by large MFIs decreases operational self-sufficiency. It 
emphasizes the concept to use long-term grants may be related to inefficient operations 
due to a lack of competitive pressures associated with attracting market funding. Thus, 
grants could hamper the development of MFIs into competitive, efficient, sustainable 
operations. 
     Kar (2012) studied the impact of capital and financing structure on the performance of 
MFIs with a large panel dataset using (GMM) and (IV) estimations with the agency 
theory as a theoretical foundation. Kar (2012) used ROA, ROE, and operating expenses 
per dollar lent (OELP) as indicators for financial performance and capital-asset ratio, 
debt-equity ratio, loan-asset ratio, and PAR30 as the indicators for capital structure and 
found that an increase in leverage raises profit-efficiency in MFIs. However, Kar (2012) 
concluded capital structure does not have any noticeable impact on the breadth of 
outreach.  
     Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) used ROA, ROE as performance indicators, and total 
debt, short term debt and long term debt as indicators for capital structure, and size, age 
and risk level as control variables for a panel data of 52 MFIs from Ghana for a period of 
ten years from 1995 to 2004, applied fixed and random effects techniques and found that 
most of the MFIs are highly leveraged, and these MFIs use more long term debt than 
short term debt. The study also found that highly leveraged MFIs perform better by 
reaching out to more clientele, enjoy scale economies, and are therefore better able to deal 
with moral hazard and adverse selection (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
     Dorfleitner, Rohe, and Renier (2017) found the positive relationship between the 
maturity of the MFIs and access to debt capital. Because of organizational form and the 
legal environment in the country, many MFIs are not permitted to collect deposits and are 
therefore forced to rely on alternative sources of funding; for example, borrowings from 
microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs). Dorfleitner, Rohe, and Renier (2017) 
examined a worldwide data set for the years 2007–2010 and used ROA and portfolio at 
risk as financial performance and the size of the MFI, and the Debt to Asset ratio as 
independent variables. Furthermore, they found that MFIs with a solid financial 
performance in terms of portfolio quality exhibit better access and suggested that MFIs 
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maintaining their social mission experience easier access to funding from MIVs. Contrary 
to Dorfleitner, Rohe, and Renier (2017); Abrar and Javaid (2016), and Pati (2014) did not 
find the relationship between age and higher profitability of MFIs. Moreover, Pati (2014) 
found the profitability of the MFIs allows them to have access to cheaper debt financing 
by issuing bonds/debentures instead of institutional sources such as formal banks. For 
example, the interest rates in developing countries are relatively high compared with 
other developed countries. Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland (2013) shows that the larger 
MFIs are more cost-effective due to the advantages afforded by potential economies of 
scale and potential scope economies between deposits and loans. MFIs with higher 
nonperforming loans require more resources to manage the higher risk (Hartarska, 
Nadolnyak, & Shen, 2012). Because of this lower asset quality, they face challenges to 
achieve outreach and sustainability. 
     The current literature on this field is heterogeneous in terms of their definition of 
capital structure and profitability/sustainability, i.e., economic sustainability of MFIs. 
These are focused on the determinants of financial structure to explain how an MFI can 
finance business activities by using debts and equities to maximize the benefits for 
shareholders based on their advantages. What is missing from the literature is the inquiry 
that addresses the effects of the financial structure of MFIs on their performance. The 
heterogeneous aspects of MFIs also need to investigate the relationship between 
microfinance funding structure and financial performance/sustainability as well as social 
outreach, depth versus breadth of microfinance services. Studies emphasizing on the 
linkage between capital structure and performance in MFIs have been few. Despite that 
Bangladesh has more MFIs than many other countries, no study has specifically focused 
on the capital structure and performance of MFIs from Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
3.1: THEORETICAL MODEL 
3.1.1: Theories of Capital Structure: 
     Current works of literature on the financial structure of firms are dominated by two 
theories which are trade-off theory and pecking order theory (Swinnen et al., 2005). Both 
emanated from Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) theorem, which is considered as the most 
important theory in finance (Pagano, 2005). These theories provide a framework for the 
effects of financial structure on the performance of firms, more specifically performance 
of financial institutions. As MM theory advocates that the cost of funds is the same in a 
perfectly competitive market. However, there are many imperfections in the market and 
there are relationships between financial structures and MFI performances. 
3.1.1.1: Modigliani and Miller (MM) theorem: 
     In 1958 Modigliani & Miller published an important work in the capital structure 
which is known as Modigliani-Miller Theorem. They concluded to the broadly known 
theory of “capital structure irrelevance” where the capital structure is irrelevant to the 
value of a firm in perfect capital markets (Abor, 2005; Miller & Modigliani, 1958). The 
Modigliani-Miller theorem explains the relationship between a company’s capital asset 
structure and dividend policy, and its market value and cost of capital. The theorem 
suggests an efficient market which means the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency 
costs, homogenous expectations where individuals and firms trade at the same rates, and 
symmetric market information where companies and investors have the same information 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). It states that the valuation of a firm 
is irrelevant to the capital structure of a company, whether a firm is highly leveraged or 
has lower debt component. Instead, debt only changes the allocation of cash flows 
between debt and equity, without changing the total cash flows of the firm and the market 
value of a firm is dependent on the operating profits of the company (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2007). In the absence of bankruptcy and agency costs, debt has a tax benefit shield, which 
leads firms to maximize their value by using as much debt as possible (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1963). Modigliani–Miller theorem is often called the capital structure irrelevance 
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principle, as the value of the firm depends neither on its dividend policy nor its decision 
to raise capital by issuing stock or selling debt.  
     Modigliani and Millers’ propositions are still the foundations of capital structures; 
however, their theory is based on very unrealistic assumptions that do not exist in the real 
world (Abor, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). In real life, there are taxes, transaction 
costs, bankruptcy costs, differences in borrowing costs, information asymmetries and 
effects of debt on earnings. There are a number of theoretical and empirical studies 
(Bradley et al., 1984; Long & Malitz,1985; Titman & Wessells, 1988) that largely support 
Modigliani-Miller theorem. Besides that, several studies have rejected the Modigliani and 
Miller Theorem because of these unrealistic assumptions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Myers, 1977; Harris & Raviv, 1990; Jensen, 1986). 
3.1.1.2: Trade-off theory: 
     Trade-off theory of capital structure refers to the trade-off between the benefits and 
costs of debt and equity financing. It is the concept that a company chooses how much 
debt finance and how much equity finance for market imperfections such as taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and agency costs. Usually, corporations are financed with a combination 
of debt and equity. There is an advantage to financing with debt which is the tax benefit 
and a cost of financing with debt which is the costs of financial distress including 
bankruptcy costs, agency costs, etc. Firms with high profit prefer more debt to equity as 
interest paid from the net income for debt will be deducted before paying the corporate 
income tax. Again, firms with low profit prefer internal funds as external funds may be 
more expensive and non-debt tax shields may be bigger than the advantage of tax benefits 
(De Angelo & Masulis,1980). At first, the marginal benefit of financing with debt 
increases as debt increases.  However, when the marginal cost increases, the marginal 
benefit of further increases in debt declines. So, a firm needs to focus on the optimal or 
trade-off point to choose how much debt and equity to use for financing.  The trade-off 
theory states that the optimal capital structure is a trade-off between interest tax shields 
and the cost of financial distress. It can be explained as: 
 
     Value of firm = Value if all-equity financed + PV (Interest tax shield) – PV (cost of 
financial distress) 
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     Initially, PV (tax shield) increases as the firm borrows more until additional borrowing 
rapidly increases the probability of financial distress. Then the value of the firm decreases 
because of the financial distress (Myers, 2001).  The firm cannot be sure to get benefit 
from the full tax shield if it borrows excessively as the cost of financial distress is 
assumed to increase with the debt level.  
     The trade-off theory explains why capital structures differ between industries. 
However, it fails to explain why profitable companies within the same industries have 
lower debt-ratios because according to the trade-off theory profitable firms have a larger 
scope for tax shields and therefore subsequently should have higher debt levels. 
3.1.1.3: The pecking order theory: 
     The pecking order theory has developed an alternative theory to the trade-off theory. 
Rather than introducing corporate taxes and financial distress into the MM framework, 
the key assumption of the pecking order theory is asymmetric information which means 
managers know more about their company's prospects, risks and value more than outside 
investors and their actions, therefore, provide a signal to investors about the prospects of 
the firm. 
     Pecking order theory claims that firms follow a financing hierarchy to minimize the 
problem of this information asymmetry (Myers, 1977 and 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
According to this theory, firms first prefer internal financing; when it is depleted, they 
prefer debt financing; finally, when it is no longer sensible to use any more debt, firms 
use equity. When firms want to raise funds through equity financing, it makes potential 
investors believe that the firm is over-valued, and they tend to place a lower value on the 
newly issued shares because of the information asymmetry (Myers, 1984). This problem 
leads firms to use debt financing, which helps them mitigate the inefficiencies in making 
investment decisions caused by the information asymmetry (Myers, 2001). Even debt 
financing might create information problems if the probability of default is significant 
since a pessimistic manager will issue debt just before bad news gets out. Because of 
these reasons, firms have hierarchical preferences over sources of funds, which are given 
to internally generated funds first, followed by debts and then equity as a last resort. 
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3.2: EMPIRICAL MODEL 
     This study attempts to examine the effect of capital structure on microfinance 
institutions performance by investigating the relationship between the observed 
performance indicators and a set of explanatory variables using multiple regression 
methods. That is, the study focuses on the source of funding of the MFIs and their relative 
profitability. The performance of MFIs is measured by Return on Asset (ROA) and Net 
Income to Expenditure (NIER) and these two variables are used as dependent variables 
which are related to the profitability as well as sustainability. Independent variables 
include Equity Asset Ratio (EAR) Debt to Loan (DTL), Deposit to Loan Ratio (DETL) 
and Deposit to Asset Ratio (DAR).  Moreover, it considers two control variables which 
are Risk and Size.  Some explanatory variables could be endogenous. To address the 
endogeneity issue 2SLS, 3SLS models are usually used with the help of instrumental 
variables. Unfortunately, this data set did not have credible instruments to use. In case of 
panel data, the fixed-effect model and the random-effects model are commonly used. 
Panel data are multi-dimensional which contain observations of many firms or individuals 
over a period of time. Panel data can take an explicit account of individual-specific 
heterogeneity, gives more data variation, less collinearity and more degree of freedom. It 
is considered better in detecting and measuring the effects than other methods. Many 
studies (Abrar & Javaid, 2016; Abor, 2005; Abor, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; 
Dorfleitner, Rohe & Renier, 2017) used panel data to determine the relationship between 
capital structure and financial performance. 
     Fixed effects model: Fixed effects model is a model in which parameters are fixed or 
non-random quantities. In econometrics, a fixed effects model refers to a regression 
model in which group means are fixed or non-random. In panel data where, longitudinal 
observations exist for the same subject, fixed effects represent the subject-specific means. 
In panel data analysis the term fixed effects estimator is used to refer to an estimator for 
the coefficients in the regression model including those fixed effects. 
     Random-effects model: In statistics, a random effects model is a model where the 
parameters are random variables. In econometrics, random effects models are used in the 
analysis of hierarchical or panel data when one assumes there are no fixed effects. The 
random effects model is a special case of the Fixed effects model. 
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     The following hypotheses have been tested: 
•    H1: Highly debt-financed microfinance institutions are expected to be more 
sustainable and profitable. 
•    H2: Higher Deposit to Loan Ratio microfinance institutions are expected to be 
more sustainable and profitable. 
•    H3: Large-scale microfinance institutions are expected to be more sustainable. 
•    H4: Highly risked microfinance institutions are expected to be less sustainable 
 
3.3: DATA: 
     This study has used an unbalanced panel data of 187 MFIs of Bangladesh which are 
collected from The Institute for Inclusive Finance and Development (InM), a Non-profit 
research organization in Bangladesh that gathers data in collaboration with UK donor 
agency funded projects. It is a well-respected organization that collects empirical 
household data from microfinance institutions and clients. This data set contains a period 
of ten years of data from 2005 to 2014. Each MFI has data for a minimum of three years 
and a maximum of ten years. The same dataset has been used for other research and thus 
can be considered as reliable. All numbers in the dataset are in BDT currency. In this 
study, STATA-15 has been used for data analysis. STATA is a very well-known 
statistical program all over the world and is a reliable tool for analyzing quantitative data. 
The effect of capital structure on MFIs performance has been identified using “Multiple 
Regression Analysis” with the numerical data.  
     In this study, profitability or sustainability of an MFIs is measured by Return on Asset 
(ROA) and Net Income to Expenditure Ratio (NIER). ROA measures how well MFI uses 
its total assets to generate income. NIER describes how well MFI can cover its costs 
through financial and operating income. For example, NIER ≥ 0 implies MFIs are 
sustainable and NIER < 0 implies MFIs are not sustainable. Different models are used to 
find the answers to the above-mentioned research questions in this study.  
3.3.1: Specification of Variables: 
     Debt: Debt of MFIs is the money borrowed for short-term or long-term from other 
financial institutions, which an MFI must pay back to lenders with interest after a specific 
agreed upon period of time. Due to a lack of enough internal funds or equity, MFIs use 
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borrowed money to expand their businesses. If an MFI is well established and has steady 
return and profitable growth, it tends to rely more on debt financing to fund their 
businesses.  
     Deposit: Deposit of MFIs refers to the sum of savings deposited by their members. 
There are two types of deposits: voluntary deposits and compulsory deposits. Voluntary 
deposits refer to the savings deposited voluntarily by the members when members of 
MFIs are solvent enough to make some savings at the market-driven interest rates and can 
withdraw their savings any time. Compulsory savings refer to a sum of money which 
borrowers must save at regular intervals with MFIs as a condition for receiving a loan. 
This savings is considered as collateral and used to cover missed payments. The borrower 
can withdraw this savings after repayment of the loan. 
     Loan: Loans of MFIs are the money that their borrowers must pay back with interest. 
Generally, this microcredit or loan is paid on a weekly basis. In accounting, a loan is 
considered as the asset of the firm. For MFIs, the loan is the major part of the asset, 
sometimes up to 99%. Usually, MFIs don’t have any other types of assets. 
     Equity: Equity of MFIs is the money received from the current owners or potential 
investors to finance business activities. According to Chasnow & Johnson (2010), there 
are two types of investors: social investors and commercial investors. First, social 
investors invest with social objectives as a high priority and commercial investors or 
private-equity funders focus more on financial returns from their investments. In 
Bangladesh, members of some MFIs are considered as the shareholders or owners of the 
MFIs. 
3.3.1.1: Dependent Variables: 
     Return on Asset (ROA): ROA measures how well the institution uses its assets. It 
reflects the profit margin as well as the efficiency of the institutions. ROA is widely 
accepted and used in several studies to measure the financial performance of Banks and 
other financial institutions. Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Silva, 2008; and Kar, 2012 used 
ROA as an indicator of financial performance in their studies. ROA is measured as 
follows: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
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     Net Income to Expenditure Ratio (NIER): NIER measures net operating revenue as 
a percentage of operating and financial expenses. It counts all the cash costs of running a 
firm, loan loss provision, depreciation. It describes how well MFI can cover its costs 
through financial and operating income. NIER is calculated as (revenue and income are 
used as synonymous): 
 
𝑁𝐼𝐸𝑅 =  
(Total Revenue − Total Expenses)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 Expenses
 
 
where, revenue and income are used as synonymous. 
3.3.1.2: Independent Variables (Measure of capital structure): 
     The explanatory (independent) variables in this study are Equity to Asset Ratio (EAR), 
Debt to Loan Ratio (DTL), Deposit to Loan Ratio (DETL) and Deposit to Asset Ratio 
(DAR).  These four ratios serve as a proxy for capital structure. 
     Equity to Asset Ratio (EAR): Equity to Asset Ratio (EAR) indicates the proportion 
of a firm’s total equity contributed to its operation. EAR is measured as: 
 
𝐸𝐴𝑅 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
 
           
     Debt to Loan Ratio (DTL): The Debt to Loan ratio measures the amount of funds 
borrowed by the firm in relation to its loan. If the use of debt is increased, it will lead to a 
higher Debt to Loan Ratio. DTL is calculated as: 
 
𝐷𝑇𝐿 =
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛
 
 
     Deposit to Loan Ratio (DETL): The Deposit to Loan Ratio measures the members 
saving or deposit of the firm in relation to its loan. DETL is calculated as: 
 
𝐷𝐸𝑇𝐿 =
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛
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     Deposit to Asset Ratio (DAR): The Deposit to Asset Ratio is a common ratio which 
measures the amount of deposits of the firm in relation to its assets. Deposit to Asset 
Ratio is comparatively highly relevant for the MFIs which mobilize the deposits. DAR is 
calculated as: 
 
𝐷𝐴𝑅 =
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
 
 
3.3.1.3: Control Variables: 
     Apart from the capital structure, there are several other factors that may have an 
impact on MFIs performance, therefore control variables are included in the model. This 
study considers two control variables which are Size and Risk.  
     Size: This study has included Size as one of the main independent variables in all 
regressions and defined as the natural logarithm of total assets to control the effects of 
diversification and differences associated with MFIs. Economies of scale is an important 
concept in economics; therefore, the size of a firm is considered an important determinant 
of a firm’s performance. Larger well-known firms may have better access to the long-
term capital market. Whereas smaller unknown firms arrange short-term funding. 
 
Size =  log(Total assets) 
 
     Risk: It has been hypothesized that MFIs are not careful in risk management. As a 
result, they may have more default loans which are considered as a risk of the MFIs. So, 
the risk is a measure of the quality of the portfolio and it has a negative effect on profit, 
efficiency, and performance of the MFIs. In this study, risk is defined as a ratio of loan 
provision to outstanding loans of MFIs which indicates how well the MFIs are collecting 
their loans and also the proportion of the provision amount against default loans to total 
outstanding loans.  
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 outstanding loans
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3.4: PROPOSED MODELS 
• Model-1 
NIER= α0 + α1EAR + α2DTL+ α3DAR + α4DETL + α5RISK + α6SIZE+ ℇi 
• Model-2 
ROA= β0 + β1EAR + β2DTL+ β3DAR + β4DETL + β5RISK + β6SIZE+ ℇj 
     where,  
  α0 , β0 = regression coefficients / Constant 
 αi , βi = regression coefficients / Slope Coefficients          i=1,2,…..,6                                                               
 ℇi and ℇj = error terms  
 ROA = Return on Asset  
 NIER = Net Income to Expenditure Ratio 
 EAR = Equity to Asset Ratio  
 DTL = Debt to Loan Ratio  
 DETL= Deposit to Loan Ratio  
 DAR = Deposit to Asset Ratio  
      
     Above regressions are estimated using panel regression technique. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 
      Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent 
variables and Table: 3 shows the proportion of NIER and ROA of MFIs, where about 
84% of MFIs has ROA greater than zero and mean value of ROA is about 2.72%. The 
standard deviation score of NIER is 1.26 and the spread of minimum and maximum 
values is from -0.84 to 46.15 with a mean value of 0.24. If the proportion of MFIs is 
considered, only 0.33% of MFIs has NIER more than 5 which affects the mean of NIER. 
However, 83.13% of MFIs has NIER more than zero and 16.87% has NIER less than or 
equal to zero. The mean of Deposit to Asset Ratio is 43% and Equity to Asset ratio is 
16%.  Most of the MFIs are highly leveraged, shown by the mean DTL of 64%. Again, 
the mean of DETL is 60%. The average default rate in terms of provision of default loan 
to total loan is about 1.7%.  
  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
NIER 1,535 0.2370705 1.264884 -0.8430468 46.15266 
ROA 1,545 0.0272149 0.0925431 -0.7981663 1.87372 
DAR 1,545 0.4265337 5.948581 0 234.0478 
EAR 1,073 0.1631065 0.1604394 -1.052481 0.7474034 
DTL 1,563 0.6362096 1.128827 0 29.05021 
DETL 1,551 0.5959346 8.301851 0 325.681 
Risk 1,563 0.0172511 0.0467612 -0.0369679 1.398942 
Size 1,547 18.52943 1.885723 12.41364 25.27294 
 
Table 3: Proportion of MFIs’ observations and level of NIER and ROA 
 No. of observations Percentage (%) 
NIER ≤ 0 259 16.87 % 
NIER > 0 to <5 1271 82.80 % 
NIER > 5 to <10 4 0.26 % 
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NIER ≥ 10 1 0.07 % 
Total 1535 100.00 % 
   
ROA ≤ 0 251 16.25 % 
ROA > 0 to <5 1294 83.75 % 
ROA > 5 to <10 0 0.00 % 
ROA ≥ 10 0 0.00 % 
Total 1545 100.00 % 
 
Correlation Matrix between NIER, ROA, Independent variables and Control 
Variables: 
     Table 4 indicates the correlation matrix for all the variables in the regression model. 
The values are spreading from -1 to 1 which are known as Pearson Correlation 
coefficients. A value near to 1 means having a strong correlation and negative value 
indicates an inverse relationship, that means when one increases other decreases.    
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix between NIER, ROA, Independent and Control 
Variables 
 
 NIER ROA DAR EAR DTL DETL Risk Size 
NIER 1        
ROA 0.6885    1       
DAR -0.0048   -0.0065    1      
EAR 0.2881    0.2284    0.1366    1     
DTL 0.0220    0.0764   -0.0028   -0.1214    1    
DETL -0.0013   -0.0022    0.9950    0.0689    0.0579    1   
Risk -0.0792   -0.3756   -0.0038   -0.0041   -0.0009   -0.0039    1  
Size 0.0359    0.0658   -0.0816   -0.0190    0.0354   -0.0828   -0.0456 1 
 
     The size of MFIs has a negative impact on Risk. The fact is that as the institution 
expands, it is able to arrange its structure to ensure repayment of loans and also able to 
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manage the risk associated with non-payment of loans. However, the coefficient between 
size and risk is very small and it is not significant with a p-value of 0.07. 
     The correlation between Deposit to Asset Ratio (DAR) and Deposit to Loan Ratio 
(DETL) is 0.995. DAR and DETL are almost the same in the case of MFIs as the loan is 
the major part of the asset for most of the MFIs. That is why, at the time of regression for 
model-1, DAR was excluded to measure the impact of the independent variable on NIER. 
Again, for model-2, DETL was excluded to measure the impact of the independent 
variable on ROA, as DAR and DETL are almost the same. 
4.2: REGRESSION RESULTS 
     The study utilizes unbalanced panel data of different MFIs of Bangladesh for a period 
of ten years from 2005 to 2014. As all the data are from MFIs of Bangladesh, the 
operating environment is the same for all MFIs. Table:5 presents the regression results, 
showing the effect of different measures of capital structure on Net Income to 
Expenditure Ratio (NIER).  
 
Table 5: Regression results of Model 1 with NIER as dependent variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient Std Error p-value Coefficient Std Error p-value 
EAR 0.6519422 0.0849522 0.000 0.2113232 0.1166586 0.070 
DTL -0.0404781 0.0116809 0.001 -0.122877 0.0116693 0.000 
DETL 0.0215626 0.0148351 0.146 0.0942912 0.0144173 0.000 
Risk -1.89085 0.2242217 0.000 -2.006688 0.2106253 0.000 
Size 0.0149981 0.0075153 0.046 0.0193064 0.0217192 0.374 
Wald chi2 (5) 159.36 329.90 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
 
     The NIER describes how well MFI can cover its costs through its income. As per 
regression results, Equity to Asset Ratio (EAR) has a positive and significant impact on 
NIER with a p-value of 0.000 under the Random effect model. When EAR is increased 
by 10%, NIER is also increased by 6.52 %. On the other hand, under Fixed effect model 
EAR positively affects NIER but it is not significant at 5% level.  
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     Again, Deposit to Loan (DETL) has also a positive relation with NIER. However, it is 
not significant under the Random effect model. Though, under the Fixed effect model, the 
regression result is significant with a p-value of 0.000. 
     Size shows positive and significant influence on NIER under the Random effect 
model. The implication is that when Size is increased by 10 %, NIER is increased by 
0.15%. 
     While Risk, as expected, has a negative effect on NIER and it is significant with a p-
value of 0.000 under both models. The NIER is decreased by 18.91 % and 20.07 % when 
Risk is increased by 10% under the Random effect model and the Fixed effect model 
respectively.  
     Debt to Loan Ratio (DTL) has a negative significant impact on NIER under both 
models which is contrary to the expectation. When DTL is increased by 10 %, NIER is 
decreased by 0.40% under Random effect model. Among all these variable EAR and Risk 
are most important because they have more impact on NIER.  
 
Table 6: Regression results of Model 2 with ROA as dependent variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect Model 
Coefficient Std Error p-
value 
Coefficient Std Error p-
value 
EAR 0.1108284 0.0136441 0.000 0.067849 0.0242801 0.005 
DTL 0.0039397 0.0017446 0.024 0.0031973 0.001969 0.105 
DAR 0.0152798 0.0185971 0.411 0.0229454 0.0355431 0.519 
Risk -0.6457785 0.0406714 0.000 -0.6403198 0.0442438 0.000 
Size 0.0021729 0.0011617 0.273 -0.0034844 0.0045779 0.447 
F  47.89 44.13 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 
 
     ROA indicates profitability as well as the efficiency of MFIs. The regression results 
using Return on Asset (ROA) as the dependent variables to measure the performance of 
MFIs and EAR, DTL, and DAR as a measure of capital structure are presented in Table 6 
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using the Random effect model and Fixed effect model. Results show EAR and Risk have 
a strong impact on ROA compared to DTL, DAR, and size.  
     Estimation identifies EAR as having a significantly positive effect with a p-value of 
0.000 on ROA which supports that the more the assets are financed through equity, there 
is more profitability. When EAR is increased by 10%, ROA also is increased by 1.11 % 
under the Random effect model. The same positive and significant result is also observed 
under the Fixed effect model.  
     It is also identified that Risk has a significant negative impact on the ROA, which 
supports the hypothesis that an increased risk leads to a decrease in profitability. when 
Risk is increased by 10% under the Random effect, ROA is decreased by 6.5 %.  
     DTL has a positive significant relation with ROA, but its effect is relatively small. 
When DTL is increased by 100 %, ROA is increased by 0.4 % under the Random effect 
model. 
     DAR has a positive impact on return on asset, but it is not significant under both 
Random Effect Model and Fixed effect Model. Like DAR, size also has a positive effect 
on ROA but not significant under Random effect model.  
     Under the Fixed Effect Model, EAR, DTL, DAR have positive relation on ROA and 
Size, and Risk have negative relation. All results are significant except for DAR and Size. 
     The whole dataset is divided into two sub-samples based on means of assets to observe 
if results vary. Sub-sample results do not show much different results from the whole 
sample results. 
     Hausman Test: The Hausman test can be used to determine which model is better 
between Random and Fixed effect models. In this study, the Hausman test is used to 
differentiate between Fixed effect model and Random effect model in panel data. As the 
individual effects are not correlated with the other regressors in the model, both random 
and fixed effects are consistent and random effects is efficient due to the low distance 
between the models.  
     The differences between fixed and random effect models (Gelman, 2004): 
1.    Fixed effects are constant across individuals, and random effects vary.  
2.    Effects are fixed if they are interested in themselves or random if there is interest in 
the underlying population.  
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3.    When a sample exhausts the population, the corresponding variable is fixed; when 
the sample is a small or negligible part of the population the corresponding variable is 
random. 
4.    If an effect is assumed to be a realized value of a random variable, it is called a 
random effect. 
5.    Fixed effects are estimated using least squares and random effects are estimated with 
shrinkage. 
     Results of Hausman test between Random effect and Fixed effect models 
Chi2 (5)     = (b-B) ‘ [(v_b-v_B) ^  (-1)] (b-B) 
                   =        1113.16 
Prob>chi2  =        0.0000 
(v_b-v_B is not positive definite) 
It describes that Random effect model is better than Fixed effect model.  
4.3: DISCUSSION     
     Findings show that Equity to Asset Ratio (EAR) has positive and significative effects 
on both NIER and ROA. It is one of the important findings which suggests a preference 
for equity-based financing at the time of taking the decision about capital structure.  
     Risk of the MFIs, measured as the proportion of the provision amount against default 
loans to total outstanding loans, has a negative and significant effect on both operational 
efficiency and profitability. This is consistent with the hypothesis H4. This finding 
suggests that reducing risk can decline costs and improve the financial performance 
significantly; as MFIs with higher nonperforming loans require more resources to manage 
the higher risk (Hartarska, Nadolnyak, & Shen, 2012). 
     Size has a positive and significant influence on operating performance of MFIs under 
Random effect model that relates to Bogan (2012). However, Size has a positive, but 
nonsignificant impact on profitability. This finding is reasonable as there are fixed and 
variable expenditures of MFIs that can be influenced by the Size of the organization. 
     Deposit to Asset Ratio (DAR) which is used to measure the proportion of the assets 
financed by savings positively impacts on ROA under Random effect model, but it is not 
significant. Again, Deposit to Loan (DETL) has also a positive relation with NIER but not 
significant. Though, many MFIs use internal savings during the financial crises to solve 
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the liquidity problems as savings has a relatively low cost of funds (Khanam et al., 2018; 
Abrar & Javaid; 2016). 
     This study also found that Debt to Loan Ratio (DTL) has a positive and significant 
impact on ROA under the Random effect model which is consistent with Abrar and 
Javaid (2016); Abor (2005); Dorfleitner, Rohe, and Renier (2017); Kar (2012); and 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007). However, DTL has a negative and significant effect on 
NIER. This finding is consistent with the previous studies such as Abor (2007); Cassar 
and Holmes (2003); and Gleason, Mathur, and Mathur (2000). Reasons being negative 
are: first, investors do not have confidence to get the return of their invested amount, 
which is why they charge high interest to MFIs which increases the operating cost of 
MFIs. Second, institutions depend on more leverage to avoid agency conflicts, thus, this 
overleveraging negatively affects institution performance (Gleason, Mathur, & Mathur; 
2000). Finally, MFIs could be employing debt excessively which is likely to result in high 
bankruptcy cost which could negatively affect performance (Abor, 2007). Both of these 
findings of DTL indicate that debt has a negative impact on an institution’s operation, but 
a positive impact on profitability. So, top managers of MFIs need to understand how they 
can compose their capital structure with both equity and debt so that the MFI might have 
a positive outcome or performance.   
4.4: STUDY CONTRIBUTIONS 
     This study contributes to the microfinance arena in several ways. First, capital 
structure theory is principally used in the corporate finance area of classic firms. Despite 
the differences in terms of objectives and operating modes of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs), this study has analysed the capital structure and performance using the same 
theoretical principles and found plausible results. Second, the impact of market-based 
financing on performance, which is the most commonly used financing mode of MFIs, is 
different from the usual belief that MFIs can only survive if they are financed by donor 
funds. Market-based financing and obligations to pay back the borrowed money 
encourage the MFIs’ managers to find innovative ways to deliver their service, keeping in 
mind that the invested capital needs to be recovered and paid back to borrowers with 
interest. This pressure improves the productivity of MFIs which is dependent on market-
based financing. Third, this study introduced the impact of size and risk of bad loans on 
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the sustainability of MFIs. It found that size has a positive correlation with ROA whereas 
risk has a negative correlation with ROA. It indicates that MFIs with less risk in terms of 
default loan enjoy more profitability and remain more sustainable, as well as the Size of 
the MFIs, in terms of their assets, also lead to higher profitability and sustainability. 
Fourth, this study analysed the operating self-sufficiency in terms of Net income to 
expenditure. This is an indicator that is developed here and describes the extent to which 
the cost of operations of MFIs can be covered by their own income.  
     Finally, the study contributes to a better understanding of how the capital structure 
affects the performances of financial sustainability. Policy makers may be able to 
adequately decide the capital structure based on the objective of their microfinance 
services proving that commercial microfinance services can be viable. They may be able 
to raise funds from internal savings, equity, and commercial sources such as banks, 
capital markets etc. and create the economy of scale. They will also be able to serve more 
poor clients and contribute both to financial sustainability, and to societal development. 
As microfinance continues to evolve both in depth and breadth, an adequate financial 
structure of the MFIs is needed to provide relevant and useful services to the poor. 
Overall results lead to the implication that MFIs should properly use capital funds like 
debt and equity to attain sustainability and profitability. 
4.5: LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
     This study used secondary unbalanced panel data of 187 MFIs of Bangladesh which 
was collected from The Institute for Inclusive Finance and Development (InM), a Non-
profit research organization in Bangladesh. This dataset contains most of the important 
MFIs including BRAC, ASA, PKSF, and BURO Bangladesh, but excludes one of the 
most important MFI: Grameen Bank. Consequently, the data has a certain sample 
selection bias. There were also some missing data in the dataset.  
     The dependent variable of the regression model may influence some of the 
independent variables. As a result, they may have an endogeneity problem. To address the 
endogeneity problem, usually an instrumental variable technique is used. Unfortunately, 
this dataset does not have variables which can be used an instrument variable technique.   
     Performance of MFIs can be measured in several ways using different variables. This 
study only considered four independent variables, two control variables, and two 
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dependent variables: Return on Asset (ROA) and Net Income to Expenditure Ratio 
(NIER) as performance measures of MFIs. Further studies could include more or different 
dependent, independent, and control variables. This study only considered the financial 
performance of MFIs of Bangladesh and did not consider social performance. Further 
studies can be recommended to analyse the effect of capital structure on both financial 
and social performance of MFIs in Bangladesh. A further study could include Grameen 
Bank; it would also be interesting to take a closer look at the effects of capital structure 
on performance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
     This study attempts to examine how capital structure affects the financial performance 
of MFIs. The study used the fixed-effect and random effect model to analyse panel data 
of 187 MFIs of Bangladesh collected from the secondary source. Results show that there 
is a positive and significant effect of EAR and negative, but significant effect of DTL on 
operating performance of MFIs from Bangladesh. It implies a preference for equity-based 
financing over debt-focused financing. It is also found that Size does have a positive 
significant impact on NIER. This finding is plausible as there are many fixed and variable 
expenditures related to the Size of the organization which may influence their operational 
performance. Risk as the proportion of the provision amount against default loans to total 
outstanding loans has a negative and significant influence on both operational efficiency 
and profitability. Overall, all these findings contribute to improving the understanding of 
the capital structure of MFIs in Bangladesh and how it relates to performance and 
sustainability. This improved understanding could enable policymakers to develop a 
balanced capital structure for MFIs following the extent of individual capital source’s 
contribution to performance and sustainability. 
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